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A sweeping and protracted reform of corporate law took place in Finland in the 
1970s. The reform brought significant improvements to investor protection and, 
similar to the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act, tightened disclosure rules at the cost of 
increasing the work load in corporate reporting. We find that the Finnish stock 
market generally reacts negatively to news of tightened disclosure rules and 
increased work loads, whereas news of delays in implementation of reform were 
largely positive. This raises the question of whether strengthening investor 
protection by requiring greater transparency necessarily promotes the 
development of financial markets. It also serves to remind that the implementation 
costs of reforms should not be overlooked. 
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Tässä keskustelualoitteessa tutkitaan Suomessa 1970-luvulla toteutetun poikkeuk-
sellisen laajan ja pitkäkestoisen osakeyhtiölain uudistamisen vaikutuksia osake-
markkinoiden toimintaan. Ensimmäisen kerran koko 1900-luvulla Suomeen saa-
tiin uusi osakeyhtiölaki. Tulokset osoittavat, että lakiuudistus paransi tuntuvasti 
sijoittajansuojaa. Kuten Yhdysvaltojen ns. Sarbanes-Oxley-säädös, myös Suomen 
uusi laki lisäsi yritysten tiedonantovelvollisuutta ja lisäsi samalla yritysten kustan-
nuksia. Suomen osakemarkkinat reagoivat enimmäkseen negatiivisesti uudistus-
prosessin kuluessa julkaistuihin uutisiin, jotka painottivat tiedonantovelvollisuu-
den lisääntymistä ja siihen liittyviä kustannuksia, kun taas lain viivästyksistä 
kertovat uutiset johtivat pääosin positiivisiin markkinareaktioihin. Voidaankin 
kysyä, onko tiedonantovelvollisuuden tiukentaminen välttämättä hyväksi rahoitus-
markkinoiden kehitykselle. Tulokset muistuttavat myös, että lainmuutosten 
yrityksille aiheuttamat kustannukset tulisi ottaa huomioon lakeja suunniteltaessa. 
 
Avainsanat: hallinnointiperiaatteet, sijoittajansuoja, laki ja rahoitus, läpinäkyvyys, 
Sarbanes-Oxley 
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Law and finance literature stemming from the works of La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV) (1997, 1998) suggests that upgraded investor 
protection could expand financial markets and increase their liquidity. Several 
authors suggest a critical role for investor protection improvements in supporting 
growth of emerging markets (eg Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman, 2000, 
Pistor, 2000, Glaeser, Johnsson and Shleifer, 2001, Mitton, 2002, and La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006). However, the recent discussion surrounding 
the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (see eg Zhang, 2007) casts a doubt on whether 
improvements of investor protection, irrespective of their implementation costs, 
are beneficial for financial market development. This is reflected in the debate on 
pros and cons of increased transparency regulation in the aftermath of recent 
financial market turbulence. There is also growing evidence (see eg Spamann, 
2006) that the results of law and finance approach are sensitive to the problems 
caused by large differences across countries. The question of whether and how 
legal protection of investors matters can hence be more fully explored in a clinical 
single country case. We present such an exploration, as we study an exceptionally 
large and long process of reforming corporate law that took place in Finland in the 
1970s. 
  As in many other countries, financial market regulation was reformed in 
Finland in the aftermath of the crisis of the 1930s and has since then been 
gradually revised. In contrast, corporate law in Finland was still in 1970 based on 
an outdated but flexible Companies Act of 1895. The Finnish stock market during 
the 1970s was small and illiquid and comparable to many of today’s emerging 
markets. One could argue that the underdeveloped and vague corporate regulation 
contributed to the small role of the stock markets in Finland. 
  The focus of this study is the reform process leading to the new corporate law 
on January 1, 1980 and its effects on stock market development and availability of 
equity financing for Finnish firms. The process was exceptionally long, lasting 
over a decade, and its effects on the relationship between the corporations and 
their investors were exceptionally large. Measured by the indices of shareholder 
and creditor protection created by LLSV (1997, 1998) and subsequently extended 
by Pistor (2000) and Glaeser et al (2001), both investor groups received 
significant improvements to their protection against abuse by corporate insiders. 
Besides the effects captured by the investor protection indices, the reform brought 
about significantly tightened disclosure rules for Finnish companies. The obvious 
economic cost of the reform was reduced corporate flexibility, and increased work 
load in corporate reporting. 
  In order to study the effects of the law-making process on the Finnish 
financial markets, we use firm-level daily stock return data. We have paired the  
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daily stock return data with informational events regarding the law-making 
process throughout the 1970s. From Kauppalehti, the leading daily business news 
paper in Finland, we have manually identified 39 articles that specifically refer to 
the upcoming corporate law. As a group of three co-authors with varied 
backgrounds, we independently coded each article as to whether they contained 
information that we deemed new information at the time, regarding delays in the 
legislative process, investor protection, and transparency brought about by the 
new law. We also judged whether the article mentioned or alluded to increases in 
reporting work load, imposed by the new law. Out of the 39 articles, our coding 
agreed on the content of 25 articles. 
  We perform an event study, using publication dates of these 25 articles as our 
event dates. To take into account a finding by Korkeamäki, Koskinen and Takalo 
(2007) that new information arrives to the Finnish market as a law is introduced to 
the parliament, we also consider the official legislative steps as additional event 
dates. 
  Performing an event study of legal reforms on emerging market data is 
methodologically challenging: Not only do we have to deal with extreme event 
day clustering common to other event studies of legal reforms but we also have to 
take into account the problems caused by infrequent trading and autocorrelation. 
On the positive side, we have a complete set of firms listed on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. The panel of firms is very stable through the decade that we study, as 
the number of firms on the Helsinki stock exchange grows at a very slow pace, 
from 43 to 49 during the 1970s. There were also no bankruptcies or delistings 
among the firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange during the decade. 
Furthermore, the news that we identify were likely to convey new information to 
the market: Most of them were on the front page of Kauppalehti. The news were 
not likely to leak to the public in advance, as the articles were based on an opinion 
of a journalist who often either interviewed alone a key law maker, or reported on 
his/her own research. In this respect our study contributes to the understanding of 
how journalists affect stock market behavior. In contrast to recent studies from the 
US (see eg Tetlock, 2007, and Fang and Peress, 2009), competition among 
financial information media was next to non-existent in Finland in the 1970s, 
which should contribute to the effect of Kauppalehti on the Finnish market. 
  We find that news paper articles focusing on the increased reporting work 
load are typically connected to a negative market response. Similarly, articles 
indicating a delay in the legislative process tend to be met by a positive reaction 
by the stock market. Evidence related to increased investor protection is more 
mixed and inconclusive. Given the tradeoffs involved, this is not as surprising as 
it may seem from the outset: The legislation improved investor protection, but it 
did so at the cost of increased disclosure and corporate work load. Nor it is clear 
from the prior literature (eg Korkeamäki et al, 2007, and Miller and Reisel, 2009) 
to what extent the creditors’ and shareholders’ interests are aligned, implying  
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ambiguous stock market reactions to creditor protection improvements. Our 
findings hence provide some support for the event-study results regarding 
introduction of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (see eg Zhang, 2007). We also support 
the theoretical literature suggesting that increased transparency regulation may not 
automatically be conducive for financial market performance (see eg Hyytinen 
and Takalo, 2002, and Chen and Hasan, 2006). 
  Evaluating the effects of corporate regulation in an emerging stock market 
involves numerous data and methodological challenges that are tackled in this 
study. We show that investor protection matters in an emerging market context 
but perhaps in a different way from that predicted by the earlier literature. In 
particular, better investor protection is not automatically positive for financial 
market development. Especially when increasing disclosure requirements, 
attention should be paid to the implementation costs of reforms. 
  The paper is organized as follows: Section two reviews the macroeconomic 
and legal background on which the reform was implemented. Section three 
describes the reform in Finland that took place in the 1970s and documents its 
impact on investor protection. Section four provides a discussion of the 
connections among investor protection and stock valuations. Section five 




2  Finland in the 1970s 
2.1 Macroeconomic  and  financial market environment 
At the end of World War II, the Finnish economy was relatively agrarian, lagging 
the other Nordic countries in terms of economic and industrial development. Since 
the war, the country’s economic structure underwent a rapid change so that in the 
1970s, heavy metals and forest-based industries formed the core of the Finnish 
economy. 
  Finland was in a delicate political situation in the 1970s. The country was 
formally neutral during the Cold War, but the political and commercial links with 
the Soviet Union were extensive, leading to the term ‘finlandization’ in 
international usage. For example, the Soviet opposition blocked the planned move 
to the Nordic common market and it was not until 1986 Finland could join the 
European Free Trade Association. Some areas of the economy deemed to have 
only domestic dimension – such as corporate law – were more free from the 
influence from the Soviet Union. 
  Starting from the 1930s, the Finnish economy and financial markets were 
increasingly regulated. While the economic crisis of the 1930s and the World War  
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II prompted similar regulatory tightening also in many other countries (see Rajan 
and Zingales, 2003) government’s regulatory outreach in the financial market in 
Finland was particularly extensive. By the end of the 1970s, the cross-border 
capital flows were controlled by the central bank, interest rate ceilings on bank 
loans and deposits existed, along with regulated quantity limits on bank lending 
(Vihriälä, 1997). Besides the direct regulation, taxation also shaped the financial 
system. Tax exemption of interest earnings was tied to a uniform deposit rate and 
terms set by the authorities, and interest expenses were often deductible in 
taxation. Equity financing, by contrast, was subject to a burdensome tax 
treatment. 
  Low nominal lending rates, tax deductibility, and high inflation resulted in 
negative real lending rates and hence in excess demand for loans in the late 1970s. 
The tax exemption of deposit interest earnings subsidised banks and effectively 
discouraged the development of other financial intermediaries. The regulations in 
turn reduced banks’ incentive to compete for market share and encouraged the 
creation of close banking relationships. Against this mix of regulation, taxation, 
and monetary policy favoring bank finance, it is hardly surprising that at the end 
of the 1970s the Finnish financial system was built on a non-competitive and 
subsidised banking sector in which long-term relationships with borrowers were 
essential and the incentives for risk management and monitoring were weak. 
  Finnish firms were roughly divided into three spheres, which were controlled 
by the main Finnish commercial banks (Lantto, 1990). Ownership of the firms 
was concentrated and the cross-ownership between financial institutions and 
nonfinancial firms was common. As a result, the financial institutions had a 
substantial influence on the decision-making of non-financial firms (Pohjola, 
1988). Because the banks held large stakes in the firms in their spheres through 
equity and debt, they provided both financial and managerial support, in case a 
firm within their sphere encountered financial difficulties. Ultimate control rights 
of the main owners were thus typically larger than their direct stakes. Pohjola 
(1988) argues that a direct voting stake of 30% were sufficient for obtaining 
control in Finnish companies. 
  Since regulation and macroeconomic environment had generated a financial 
system based on the main-bank structure, it was not surprising that the stock 
market, while less regulated, was small and illiquid. For example, in 1970, there 
were only 43 firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. 
  Towards the end of the 1970s, intermediation restrictions and accelerating 
inflation made it increasingly evident that the financial system could no longer 
satisfy the financing needs of Finnish companies. The difficulties in the financial  
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sector and the example of the UK and the other Nordic countries led to the 




2.2 Legal  environment 
The Finnish legal system has historically evolved in a close connection with other 
Nordic countries. Especially Swedish legislation has been influential due to 
Finland’s union with Sweden which lasted for more than 700 years. 
  Like the other Nordic countries, Finland was relatively advanced in terms of 
independent legal enforcement in the late 1960s. However, the legislation 
concerning investor protection was outdated, being mainly rooted in the 
Companies Act of 1895, in the Liquidation Bankruptcy Code and the Decree on 
Claim Priorities of 1868, and the Act on Compositions of 1932.
2 
  The Companies Act of 1895 was prepared simultaneously with similar 
Swedish and Norwegian corporate law reforms. The law was fairly ‘Coasean’, 
giving only general framework of investor protection. It regulated mainly 
founding of corporations, while leaving vast contractual freedom for charter 
provisions regarding a broad range of issues. This flexibility partially explains 
why the pressure for a law reform began to build only in the late 1960s. There 
were only 10 amendments to the Companies Act of 1895 during its entire 
existence. As a result, when the 1970s approached, corporate governance was 
little regulated in contrast to many other areas of the Finnish economy. By then, it 
was only natural to think that corporate governance, too, should be regulated in 
more detail. 
  The Companies Act of 1895 had particularly scant provisions on investor 
protection and disclosure rules. For example, the law contained only one 
significant mandatory minority shareholder provision: 10% of share capital was 
sufficient to call an extraordinary shareholder’s meeting. The scope for 
expropriation of minority shareholders had been a concern at least since the 
1930s.
3 It was thought that the new law should put in place more explicit controls 




                                                 
1 See Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1995) and Vihriälä (1997) for comprehensive accounts of the 
liberalisation. 
2 The Liquidation Bankruptcy Code, the Decree on Claim Priorities of 1868, and the Act on 
Compositions of 1932 were only reformed in the early 1990s (see Korkeamäki et al, 2007, for the 
effects of these reforms). 
3 An amendment of 1935 (350/1935, effective 15 November 1935) tried to protect minority 
shareholders by requiring equal treatment of shareholders by the decisions made in the 
shareholders’ meeting.  
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3  The corporate law reform of 1970s 
The preparation for the new corporate law began already in the late 1960s as a 
joint effort of four Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden). 
As mentioned above, the goal of the new law was to increase regulatory outreach 
of the corporate law. 
  Based on the government’s official documents and the newspaper articles we 
have read (see Section 3.1), it is evident that the new law aimed at increased 
public disclosure of corporate information. It provided detailed regulation on 
conglomerate auditing and accounting, and required increased disclosure 
regarding ownership structure and identity of main shareholders. Added 
transparency regarding use of convertibles and warrants in corporate financing 
was also among the new requirements. The new law furthermore aimed to reduce 
the threshold for firms to incorporate, and to enhance Finnish corporations’ ability 
to raise equity capital. It also tried to specify the position of shareholders and 
corporate board members. Even though the legal principals of corporate 
regulation went practically unchanged, regulation got more precise, with less 
room for judgement. 
  The effect of the new corporate law (the Companies Act 734/1978, effective 
January 1, 1980) on investor protection is quantified by Rainio (2006). She 
employs the popular index measures by LLSV (1997, 1998), and their extensions 
by Pistor (2000) and Glaeser et al (2001), to measure the effect of the reform both 
on creditors and shareholders. The indices indicate an improvement in shareholder 
protection. The eight-point scale by LLSV moves from 2 to 4
4, and the Pistor 
index moves from 2 to 4, upon the reform. An exception is the Glaeser et al index, 
which shows a slight deterioration from 6.3 to 5.3, on the scale of 0 to 16. The 
deterioration is due to the new law disallowing bearer shares and preference 
shares.
5 
  Despite the fact that Finland has a separate bankruptcy code, the Companies 
Act of 1980 also affected creditor protection. Two measures in the LLSV (1997, 
1998) creditor protection index changed, resulting in an improvement in the 
LLSV index measure from 2/5 to 4/5. Prior to the reform, Finnish corporations 
could themselves initiate the bankruptcy proceedings, without creditor consent. 
The Companies Act of 1980 requires an approval by the firm’s major creditor 
                                                 
4 The reading of 4 agrees with the LLSV (1997, 1998) value for Finland, which is also based on 
the Companies Act of 1980 that was in force until 2006, with a major revision taking place in 
1997, after LLSV collected their data. However, it is worth noting that Rainio (2006) disagrees 
with LLSV on the individual factor coding. While LLSV argue that firms are not allowed to block 
trade of their own shares before the shareholders’ meeting and that cumulative voting is not 
allowed in Finland, Rainio (2006) cites Finnish legal references in support of the opposite. The 
two disagreements cancel each other out, giving the same overall rating for both studies. 
5 Both share types were extremely rare prior to the law change, but since the index measures 
changes in the letter of the law rather than the practice, both changes reduce the index level.  
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prior to the firm entering the bankruptcy proceedings. The previous corporate law 
also allowed the firm to decide on the order of liquidation of its assets, whereas 





3.1  Process towards the corporate law of 1980 
The law change that took effect at the beginning of 1980 was anticipated well in 
advance. The first proposal draft for the new corporate law was published by the 
government already in 1969. Unfortunately, our stock returns data source does not 
allow us to consider the earliest events in our analysis, as our data set begins from 
February 2, 1970. In search of newspaper articles related to the anticipated law 
change, we manually explored daily editions of Kauppalehti, the leading business 
daily newspaper in Finland at the time, and even today. The earliest mentions of a 
planned new corporate law are from the spring of 1970. In total, we identify 39 
articles published during the 1970s that specifically mention the planned corporate 
law change. Most of the articles either discuss the content of the law proposal, or 
report on its progress. Also, three of the events we consider represent days for the 
legislative steps that the law took. 
  In order to explore the type of information released in the newspaper articles, 
we performed content analysis of each article. Among the three authors of this 
study, we independently judged each article along three dimensions, by 
determining whether the article contained new information related to a delay in 
the legislative process, an increase in the reporting work load for the companies, 
or a change in investor protection.
7 Consensus among all three authors was 
required in order for an article to be classified under each category, and we 
analyze further only articles that all three authors independently agree to be 
significant at least in one of the dimensions. We also study entire issues of 
Kauppalehti on days around each event to search for potential sources of event 
contamination. Table 1 provides information on the events. 
 
                                                 
6 This also illustrates the liberal nature of the Companies Act of 1895. In practice, priority of 
secured creditors was commonly respected, but the letter of law did not require it. 
7 As changes in investor protection were difficult to differentiate between those affecting creditor 
protection and shareholder protection, we considered investor protection as a single dimension.  
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Table 1.   Events and news paper articles during preparation 
      of the 1980 corporate law 
 
The table lists legislative steps, and news related to preparation of the Finnish corporate law of 
1980. Columns ‘delay’, ‘inv prot’, and ‘work load’ indicate authors’ independent judgement on 
whether the content of each article contained information emphasizing a delay in the legislative 
process, a change in investor protection, or increase in work load, respectively. 
 










“Konserni vieras lainsäädännössä; uusi oyl 
selkeyttää konsernilainsäädäntöä” “Oy-laki 
suppea kainsainvälisesti” 
 X      
21.10.1970  Kirjanpito- ja osakeyhtiölait koordinoitava 
elinkeinotuloverolain (EVL) kanssa  4  X  X  
21.12.1970  Osakeyhtiölaki voimaan -75?  1  X    X   
29.12.1970  Kirjanpitolaki ainoaksi tilinpäätösten 
säätäjäksi  4  X    
1.9.1972  Kuolleiden firmojen kummittelu lakkaa  1         
24.1.1974  Tilintarkastajille uusi organisaatio; uusi oyl 
vaatii  8  X    
2.9.1974  Proposal for new corporate legislation          X 
8.11.1974 Tietoja  lisää  osakeyhtiöistä  18  X  X  
29.1.1975  Yhden miehen tehoryhmästä huolimatta uusi 
osakeyhtiölaki siirtyy jatkuvasti  1 X       
24.10.1975  Uusi oy-laki laajentaa tilintarkastuksen 
tehtäväkenttää  6  X  X  
21.7.1976  Osakeyhtiölaki puoluepunnitaan; laki voimaan 
aikaisintaan 1978  1 X       
18.2.1977  Uusi osakeyhtiölaki eduskuntaan tässä kuussa  1    X     
22.3.1977  Tämän vuosikymmenen tavoite: Oy-
lainsäädäntö pohjoismaiselle pohjalle  4  X  X  
29.3.1977  Government’s proposal to the parliament          X 
7.6.1977  Pääsääntö uuden oy-lain myötä: 
Toimintakertomuksen paljastettava paljon  1  X  X  
15.6.1977  Hajasijoituksesta on vain haittoja  back 
cover X      
12.9.1977  Oy-lain uusi kompastuskivi: E-liike ei 
hyväksy KHT-tilintarkastajia  1    X  
26.9.1977  Uusi vaatimus laskentatoimelle: 
Konsernienkin tilit vaaditaan julkisiksi  1    X  
19.1.1978  Uusi oy-laki poistaa esteet optiokaupasta  back 
cover     
2.6.1978  Parliament decision, 3. round          X 
3.7.1978  Oy-laki voimaan vasta 1980  1  X    X   
29.9.1978  Law enacted; Oy-laki haaste kauppakamarille: 
Tilintarkastajien koulutus kovenee  9  X  X 
8.11.1978  Pörssiyhtiöiden vuosikertomukset tutkittu: 
Avoimuus lisääntynyt  11  X  X  
1.12.1978  Taloudellinen lainsäädäntö 80 -teemasivut; 
oyl-uudistusta koskevia uutisia  9    X  
29.12.1978  Uusi oy-laki tuo työläät konsernitilinpäätökset  1      X   
27.3.1979  Uudessa oy-laissa peräti 167 pykälää  1    X  X   
1.1.1980  Law takes effect          X 
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As Table 1 shows, many of the articles appeared on the front cover of 
Kauppalehti. Seven of the articles, mainly from the early part of the decade, 
emphasized a delay in the process. Ten articles had a focus on investor protection, 
and thirteen of them emphasized an increase in work load. A number of them had 
more than one emphasis, according to our judgment. 
 
 
4  The economic impact of legal reforms 
The valuation effect of the events under our consideration is ambiguous, ex ante. 
As discussed above, the Companies Act of 1980 brought about significant 
improvements in both shareholder protection and creditor protection in Finland 
through more direct guidance and increased transparency. While improvements in 
shareholder protection should most likely result in a positive stock value reaction, 
improvements in creditor protection could affect the stock price negatively, eg if 
they implied a wealth transfer from stock holders to lenders in case of bankruptcy 
(see Korkeamäki et al, 2007 and Miller and Reisel, 2009). Many reform features, 
especially those concerning increased disclosure, clearly also imply direct 
compliance costs, which should adversely affect the stock prices.
8 Under the 
premise that improvements offered by the reform were good news to the stock 
market in general, any delays in the legislative process should be met with 
negative stock reactions. If, however, the market judged that the costs of 
implementing the new regulations would surpass their benefits, the reaction could 
be the opposite, in particular to news that highlight the reporting burden. 
  Our judgement of information content of the articles, made after 30 years 
from their publication, can also be justifiably questioned. On the other hand, 
compared with the recent studies on the effects of mass print media on the stock 
market (eg Tetlock, 2007, and Fang and Peress, 2009), and unlike with many 
other corporate events, we can be considerably more confident that information 
contained in the articles was genuine news. Kauppalehti was, and still is, the 
leading business news paper in Finland, and there was little competition from 
other media back in the 1970s. About half of the articles we consider appeared on 
the front cover, and many articles seem to be the products of the journalists who 
eg had interviewed alone a key law maker. Ultimately, our event study results in 
the next section should shed light on whether and in what way each article 
contained new information to the market. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Hyytinen and Takalo (2002) argue that there can also be indirect compliance costs arising from 
informational spillovers created by disclosure regulation.  
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5 Data 
Data constraints tend to plague studies of corporate finance from earlier time 
periods. The Finnish stock market in the 1970s can be characterized as an 
emerging market. At the end of the decade, the total annual stock market turnover 
reached 4 billion euros (measured in 2006 terms), which is comparable in 2006 to 
markets such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Jamaica and Ukraine. The problems we have 
faced with data availability and accessibility in this study may be even more 
severe than those with current day’s emerging markets. As digitization and 
electronic data access were unknowns in the 1970s, our efforts to overcome data 
problems have included a large amount of manual data collection. 
  Our stock return data come from the Hanken School of Economics database 
on Finnish stock returns from the 1970s. We have used the daily return series on 
individual firms, which were used to construct the so called WI-index. Details on 
the data collection for this index are reported in Berglund, Wahlroos and Grandell 
(1983). The data set includes all firms traded on the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
during the time period. We supplement our returns data with firm-specific 
accounting information that has been hand-collected from annual editions of 
Pörssitieto year books. 
  Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on our sample. The emergent nature of 
the Finnish stock market in the 1970s is illustrated by a small number of firms, 
and especially by the extremely low turnover of shares traded on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. While the median number for shares traded per day increases 
from 28 to 120 during the 1970s, even in 1979, firms with less than 10 shares 
traded on an average trading day exist. 
 
Table 2.   Descriptive statistics for firms 
      on the Helsinki Stock Exchange by year 
 
The table reports median values for each year. Assets and sales are in FIM millions, 
turnover is in number of shares traded on an average trading day. 
 
Year N  Assets  Sales  Turnover 
1970 43  208.8  204.46  28 
1971 44  237.3  194.23  28.5 
1972 44  284.15  245.85  41.5 
1973  46 332.05  317.35 65 
1974  46 438.59  433.51 75 
1975 46  499.775  445.91  51 
1976 49  482.2  483.345  54.5 
1977  49 555.02  446.13 88 
1978  49 592.38  483.77 89 
1979 49  633.35  577.39  120 
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It is well documented that daily return series tend to be autocorrelated. The 
problem is more severe for assets that are infrequently traded (Scholes and 
Williams, 1977). It is therefore no surprise that the return series that we use for 
this paper suffer from severe autocorrelation. Berglund and Liljeblom (1988) list 
factors that make Finnish data from the 1970s particularly affected by 
autocorrelation. Firstly, the trading rules on the Helsinki Stock Exchange during 
our sample period were such that the list of companies traded on the exchange 
was ‘called out’ during the morning trading hours, and at that point, the bid-ask 
spread for the day was established. Since trades outside that spread were, by rules 
of the exchange, not allowed on that trading day, the price of a firm in the early 
part of the list would react to news that arrive later on day t (or even during the 
calling out process) only on day t+1. Secondly, the daily return series in our data 
source are tabulated so that for each stock that failed to trade on a certain day, the 
last trade price is substituted by the bid price (use of the bid-ask midpoint is not 
possible, as for a number of companies, only bid but no ask price exists on 
numerous trading days). We deal with these empirical challenges in our 




We conduct an event study around events related to the news paper articles and 
legislative events detailed above. For each event, we use a 250-day estimation 
window and an event window of (0,+1).
9 Our choice of the event window is 
motivated in part by the trading system of the Helsinki Stock Exchange during our 
sample period. As discussed above, whether the news of day 0 are reflected on the 
stock return for the company on the same day or not depends on where that 
company is on the list that is called out during the morning hours at the exchange. 
Particularly for companies that come up early on the list, inclusion of day +1 in 
the event window is therefore critical. 
  Research of market reactions to law changes is plagued by extreme event date 
clustering, as all firms in the market share the same event date (see eg Binder, 
1985). In such cases, Schwert (1981) and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinley (1997) 
suggest using a portfolio of returns instead of making inferences about market 
reactions based on reactions of individual stocks. At the aggregate market level, 
our primary measure of market returns is an equally-weighted index that we 
construct from the Hanken School of Economics data base. With an equally-
                                                 
9 Since our return data begins from February 1970, we do not have information available for 250 
trading days prior to our first four events. For those events, we have used the method familiar from 
the IPO literature, where a post-event estimation period is used (eg Mikkelson and Partch, 1986). 
For those cases, we use a 250-day estimation period beginning on the 2nd day after the event day.  
18 
weighted index, we hope to capture the market reaction of the average Finnish 
firm to each event. However, use of an equally-weighted index increases the 
relative weight of infrequently traded stocks in the portfolio, which intensifies the 
technical problems discussed above. We tackle this issue in three ways. First, we 
adjust the original return series to account for the bid rate quotes used for stocks 
with no trades on certain days. Second, we use the algorithm suggested by 
Jokivuolle (1995) to correct for autocorrelation in the time series. Third, we use 
alternative measures for aggregate market reaction to study the robustness of our 
results. 
  The abnormal returns for our portfolio are measured by the coefficient β2 in 
equation (6.1). 
 
ε + β + β + α = + ) 1 , 0 ( 2 t , mkt 1 t , pf D R R ( 6 . 1 )  
 
where 
Rpf = Return on the equally-weighted Finnish stock portfolio on day t; 
Rmkt = Return on the Stockholm Stock Exchange on day t; 
D(0,+1) = Dummy variable that takes on value of one during the event window, 
zero otherwise. 
 
For each event, we use trading days (-250, -10) as the estimation period. In other 
words, we include (-250,  -10) in each estimation, while excluding the days 
leading into each event (-9,  -3).
10 For the market portfolio (Rmkt), we use the 
Jacobson and Ponsbach (JP) index that follows the Stockholm Stock Exchange. 
Our choice of market portfolio is driven partly by data restriction, and partly by 
the nature of the Finnish market in the 1970s. Commonly used international 
indices, such as the MSCI indices do not have daily data available until 1972. 
Also, consistent with today’s emerging markets, the Finnish stock market was 
extremely segmented in the 1970s. Correlation of the daily returns of our equally-
weighted index is below 3% for both FTSE and DAX-indices, while the JP index 
exhibits a 7.9% correlation with our index. Our findings are, however, essentially 
identical if we use alternative European indices. Given that controlling for market 
returns is somewhat questionable in a case where market returns do not appear to 
have hardly any influence on the Finnish returns, we will also report results based 
on regressions where the market portfolio is not present. 
 
                                                 
10 Exclusion of pre-event days has no effect on our results, which makes sense, given our 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The abnormal portfolio returns are presented in Table 3. In the interest of space, 
we only report the t-statistics of the β2-coefficient for the dummy variable D(0,+1). 
In the first two columns of the table, the equally-weighted index of the Finnish 
stock market is used to measure the market’s reaction to each event. In columns 3 
and 4, we adjust the Hanken School of Economics data in the following way. The 
daily data in the database contains several firms that are rarely traded. For firms 
that fail to trade on a certain day, the buy quote is reported (the sell quote did not 
exist for many of this, which motivates the use of the buy quote). However, if a 
stock fails to trade on day t, but then it trades on day t+1, we observe a part of the 
return that is connected with a move from a buy quote to a trade, which can be 
substantial for the most illiquid stocks with wide bid-ask spreads. For this reason, 
we manually observe prices for each stock during each of the event windows from 
the stock market page of Kauppalehti and replace ‘buy quote to trade’ returns 
with ‘buy quote to buy quote’ returns for those stocks.
11 We continue to use trade-
to-trade returns for those firm s for which such returns are available. The equally-
weighted returns used in columns 3 and 4 are constructed from those firm-level 
returns. The results differ from those in columns 1 and 2 with regards to several 
events, suggesting that inclusion of ‘buy quote-to-trade’ returns is behind some of 
the findings (and non-findings) in columns 1 and 2. In columns 5 and 6, 
autocorrelation is filtered out of our Finnish market returns, using the 
methodology suggested by Jokivuolle (1995).
12 In columns 7 and 8, we replace 
the equally-weighted index with the HEX-index. We also use the market-
weighted WI-index from the Hanken School of Economics as an alternative 
market-weighted measure. The results based on that index are practically identical 
to those based on the HEX-index (results not reported). Furthermore, in columns 
1, 3, 5, and 7, we use the JP index for the market portfolio, while in columns 2, 4, 
6, and 8, the analysis is done without controlling for the market portfolio returns. 
  Overall, a number of articles and law events are connected with statistically 
significant abnormal returns, suggesting that the events we study convey new 
information to the market. Autocorrelation does not appear to affect our results 
significantly, as the results based on filtered data are very similar to those based 
on raw data. We subsequently focus on returns of the adjusted equally-weighted 
index and the HEX-index, as those are less dependent on the technical problems 
with infrequently traded stocks. 
  Four of the article publication events exhibit consistent results for both the 
adjusted equally-weighted index and HEX index, regardless of whether we 
                                                 
11 Correcting for non-trades only within each event window causes our model parameters to be 
misspecified, as the bid-to-trade returns exist also within estimation periods. This concern is 
reduced to some extent by the very low loading on the market factor that is common among our 
sample firms. Also, this artificial volatility should bias us against finding significant results. 
12 Due to the complex nature of autocorrelation that we observe in our data, we use the ARMA 
(3,1) process to filter autocorrelation from the data. Not surprisingly, the use of Newey-West 
standard errors on the equally-weighted index returns results in qualitatively similar results.  
22 
control for the market portfolio returns or not. Out of those four, three articles 
were published on the front cover of Kauppalehti. Based on our judgment on the 
content of each article, it is difficult to draw consistent conclusions regarding 
these market-wide findings. The article with consistently positive findings 
(published on December 21, 1970) emphasized a delay in the progress and an 
increase in work load. However, two of the articles (November 8, 1974 and 
September 12, 1977) that were met with a negative reaction also included 
information about an increase in work load, and one (January 29, 1975) with a 
negative reaction emphasized a delay in the progress. The negative reaction to the 
November 8, 1974 event may, however, be a result of event contamination. On 
the same day, the Bank of Finland urged tightening of bank financing terms in 
Finland. The law’s introduction to the parliament on March, 29 1977 seems to 
generate a positive and significant market reaction, however only for the HEX-
index and for the non-adjusted ew-index. This finding is consistent with 
Korkeamäki et al (2007), who provide evidence suggesting that new information 
is released to the market when a law is introduced to the Finnish parliament. 
  Market-wide effects are difficult to detect as different types of firms may 
react differently to the news. Some markedly different reactions between the 
HEX-index and the equally-weighted index may suggest differing implications for 
small and large firms. The HEX-index includes only the 25 largest firms in the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange.
13 There are three events for which the adjusted ew-
index indicates a positive abnormal return, while no significant reaction is present 
for the HEX-index. Out of those three, two events contained information about a 
delay in the legislative process, and one was a legislative step event. This provides 
further evidence of the delays being good news, at least for smaller firms. Indeed, 
when the ew-index is used, the events emphasizing a delay in the process were 
always met with either a positive reaction or an insignificant reaction, except for 
the aforementioned January 29, 1975 article. 
  All of the cases in which the equally-weighted index is the only one to react 
negatively emphasize an increase in investor protection. It is somewhat puzzling 
that smaller firms appear to suffer (in relative terms) from increases in investor 
protection, although shareholders of smaller firms could suffer more from creditor 
rights improvements. The two cases where only the HEX-index reacts negatively 
contain information about the increase in corporate reporting work load. This 
could be explained by an increase in requirements for consolidated book-keeping, 
mostly affecting larger firms. As mentioned above, the HEX-index is positively 
                                                 
13 The HEX-index includes the most frequently traded firms on the exchange, which reduces the 
technical concerns caused by infrequent trading, which were discussed above. It is also interesting 
to note that unlike later studies using Finnish data, our study is not plagued by ‘the Nokia-effect’, 
meaning that we do not have a single company representing a disproportionate share of the market. 
Even at the end of the 1970s, Nokia was only the fourth largest firm on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange by sales, or third largest by the market capitalization.  
23 
affected by the law’s introduction to the parliament, and also by an article 
publication emphasizing a delay and an increase in work load, published on 
October 21, 1970. 
  Next, we compile all events that emphasize an increase in work load, an 
increase in investor protection, or a delay in the legislative process, respectively. 
We use firm-level data to calculate the average β2 – coefficient in equation (6.1) 
for each firm across each type of events, and use it as the dependent variable.
14 
Our explanatory variables include firm-specific averages of annual values for 
ln(market capitalization), dividend yield, and the percentage owned by top-10 
shareholders, foreigners, and government, respectively. We also include a dummy 
variable that takes on the value of one for banking institutions.
15 The results are 
reported in Table 4. 
  From Table 4, we see that news on delays in the legislative process and news 
on increases in workload provide fairly similar results. Both types of articles are 
met with a more positive than average reaction among stocks with high foreign 
ownership and high government ownership. This could be explained by those 
firms being less dependent on the Finnish stock market as a financing source. 
Similarly, firms with high dividend yields react negatively to news on delays and 
increases in workload. This finding is consistent with LLSV (2000) who suggest 
that firms that pay high dividends are more reliant on developed financing 
markets. Improvements in investor protection affect firms with high foreign 
ownership more negatively than average. Especially features that increase creditor 
protection could hurt foreign investors who perhaps do not rely on the letter of the 
law for shareholder protection, but are powerless when the law tips the balance of 
power towards creditors (as suggested by LLSV, 2000). 
  We next analyze the cross-sectional determinants of individual cumulative 
abnormal returns around each event. The results are reported in Table 5. The 
control variables for firm-specific returns around each event mirror those used 
above. While Panel A reports event-specific findings for each event, we have 
grouped the findings in Panel A by the types of the events in Panels B, C, and D. 
In Panel B, we report results on all events that indicated a delay in the legislative 
process. Delays appear to be better than average news for firms with high 
government or foreign ownership, which is consistent with the findings reported 
above. Firms in those groups may be less dependent on the Finnish stock market, 
which is why delays in the process do not affect them as much as the average 
firm. Firms with high ownership share among top-10 shareholders seem to suffer 
                                                 
14 The event type alone does not have a consistent effect on the market reaction. When we regress 
the firm-specific coefficients for the event dummy on the indicators for different types of the 
events, only the legislative process dummy enters with a significant (negative) sign (results not 
reported). 
15 It should be noted that these values are very stable for firms across the sample years, which 
motivates the use of average values.  
24 
from delays, and same holds to some extent for larger firms and firms with high 
dividends. It is possible that these firms’ higher dependence on the Finnish equity 
markets makes them suffer when the reform faces delays. 
 
Table 4.   Market reactions by type of the event 
 
Table displays OLS results where the dependent variable is the average coefficient on the 
dummy for each firm and each type of the event. Each explanatory variable is averaged 
for each firm across all sample years. Bank dummy is an indicator variable that takes on a 
value of one for banking firms, zero otherwise. Log(Mkt. cap) is the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization. Dividend yield is the percentage dividend yield offered by the firm. 
Ownership by top-10, foreign ownership, and gov’t ownership indicate the percentage 
ownership of each respective shareholder group. Columns entitled ‘Delay’, ‘Workload’ 
and ‘Protection’ include only events that fall into each respective category, as indicated in 
Table 1. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Event type  Delay  Workload  Protection 
Dependent var.  D (0,+1)  D (0,+1)  D (0,+1) 
CONSTANT 0.00797  0.0091  0.0040 
  (0.580) (0.392) (0.226) 
Bank dummy  -0.0011  0.0068**  0.0022 
 (-0.434)  (2.121)  (0.750) 
Log (Mkt. cap)  -0.0004  -0.0007  -0.0004 
  (-0.691) (-0.640) (-0.417) 
Dividend yield  -0.0118  -0.0115***  0.0019 
 (-7.294)  (-4.191)  (0.368) 
Ownership by top-10  -0.0039  0.0069  0.0094 
 (-0.553)  (0.847)  (0.941) 
Foreign ownership  0.0593***  0.0183***  -0.0394*** 
 (6.267)  (3.366)  (-5.737) 
Gov’t ownership  0.0007***  0.0005***  -0.0001 
 (10.927)  (4.624)  (-0.501) 
N  35 34 34 
ADJ. R
2  0.5535 0.2213 0.2622 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  The findings on work load increase are reported in Panel C. Similar to the 
delay news, foreign ownership and government ownership is generally related to 
better-than-average stock reactions. Also, larger firms and firms with high 
dividends again seem to suffer more than the average firm. Banks’ reactions to 
work load increases are almost monotonously positive. This is possibly explained 
by the required reporting procedures already being in place in banks prior to the 
reform, so that implementation costs of the new law were lower for banking 
industry.  
  The results on investor protection-related news are reported in Panel D. 
Consistent evidence is provided by variables for Asset size (negative effect), 
Dividend yield (negative effect), and percentage of top-10 ownership (positive 




From 1970 towards the end of a millennium, the Finnish stock market 
transformed from a very thinly traded emerging market to a modern financial 
market. We study the first one in a series of institutional changes that made this 
transformation possible. As of 1970, the regulations covering most corporate 
activity in Finland were based on an outdated corporate law which was enacted in 
1895. The focus of this study is the complex process – a joint effort of 
Scandinavian countries lasting over a decade – which led into the new corporate 
law on January 1, 1980. 
  Our results are mixed, and thus they fail to offer consistent support for 
market-wide benefits from the new legislation to the Finnish firms. In a closer 
examination of the events leading to the reform, we find that firms that are likely 
to be more dependent on raising equity financing in the Finnish public market 
suffer from delays in the legislative process. Regarding increased corporate 
reporting work load that resulted from the reform, our results are consistent with 
Zhang (2007) evidence that in the US, the vastly increased disclosure 
requirements introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 were met by a 
negative stock market response. While the literature emphasizes the importance of 
investor protection and disclosure requirements in development of stock markets, 
the compliance costs imposed by reforms should not be overlooked.  
31 
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